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Abstract
In this paper we introduce the concept of quasi-building set that may underlie the coali-
tional structure of a cooperative game with restricted communication between the players.
Each feasible coalition, including the set of all players, contains a nonempty subset called
the choice set of the coalition. Only players that are in the choice set of a coalition are
able to join to feasible subcoalitions to form the coalition and to obtain a marginal contri-
bution. We demonstrate that all restricted communication systems that have been studied
in the literature take the form of a quasi-building set for an appropriate set system and
choice set. Every quasi-building set determines a nonempty collection of maximal strictly
nested sets and each such set induces a rooted tree satisfying that every node of the tree
is a player that is in the choice set of the feasible coalition that consists of himself and
all his successors in the tree. Each tree corresponds to a marginal vector of the under-
lying game at which each player gets as payoff his marginal contribution when he joins
his successors in the tree. As solution concept of a quasi-building set game we propose
the average marginal vector (AMV) value, being the average of the marginal vectors that
correspond to the trees induced by all maximal strictly nested sets of the quasi-building
set. Properties of this solution are also studied. To establish core stability we introduce
appropriate convexity conditions of the game with respect to the underlying quasi-building
set. For some specifications of quasi-building sets, the AMV-value coincides with solutions
known in the literature, for example, for building set games the solution coincides with
the gravity center solution and the Shapley value recently defined for this class. For graph
games it therefore differs from the well-known Myerson value. For a full communication
system the solution coincides with the classical Shapley value.
Key words: Set system, nested set, rooted tree, chain, core, convexity, marginal vector,
Shapley value
AMS subject classification: 47H10, 49J40, 52C40, 90C30, 91B50.
JEL code: C71.
1 Introduction
In the classical model of cooperative games with transferable utility (TU games) it is
assumed that any subset of players can form a coalition and obtain some worth. In many
situations of cooperations, however, there are restrictions for forming feasible coalitions.
One of the most well-known examples is the Myerson communication graph game ([18]),
where the possibility of forming coalitions is modeled by means of an undirected connected
communication graph. The vertices of the graph are identified with the players, and players
that are connected by an edge are able to communicate. A feasible coalition is in this
model a subset of players satisfying that the induced subgraph on this subset is connected.
Another example is a game on a partially ordered set, or poset, see [9, 13]. In such a
game there is a partial order on the players set, for example a hierarchy, and a coalition is
feasible if it is a subset of players which form an ideal, or filter, that is all players which
are dominated by one of the players, or dominate that player, have to be members of the
coalition. An extension of games on posets is games on augmenting systems, introduced in
[4], where there is an anti-exchange closure operator on the set of players, and a coalition is
feasible only if it is a closed set with respect to this closure operator. Other set systems of
feasible coalitions for cooperative games with restricted coalitions that have been considered
in the literature are union stable structures ([1]), convex geometries ([6, 5]), and partition
system ([3]), or building sets ([17]). In all these models, marginal vectors are defined,
although using different methods, and Shapley-type values are studied as solutions, that
is, the average of marginal vectors is taken as solution concept to determine how much
payoff every player will get.
In a cooperative game a marginal vector is a payoff vector at which with respect to
some specific collection of coalitions a player receives as payoff the difference in worth when
he joins to the unique smallest (with respect to set-inclusion) coalition in the collection
that contains this player. For example, when all coalitions are feasible, every permutation
on the set of players induces a marginal vector where each player receives his marginal
contribution when he joins to the set of predecessors in that permutation. For a TU game
the Shapley value is the average of the marginal vectors over all permutations. In case of a
communication graph game Myerson [18] introduced the Myerson value, being the Shapley
value of the restricted game for which the worth of a coalition which is not connected is
restricted to be equal to the sum of the worths of the maximally connected subcoalitions,
or components, of the coalition.
Instead of defining a restricted game, other Shapley-type of solution concepts that
have been introduced in the literature either restrict the collection of permutations or
consider the collection of maximal strictly nested sets induced by the set system. For
example, in posets, augmenting systems and convex geometries only those permutations
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are considered for which the coalition consisting of any player with his predecessors, or
successors, is feasible. A strictly nested set of a set system of feasible coalitions is a sub-
collection of feasible coalitions, including the set of all players, such that any two of its
elements are disjoint or one is a subset of the other, and, moreover, the union of any
collection of subsets of disjoint elements of the collection is not a feasible coalition. Each
maximal strictly nested set induces a (rooted) tree, being a partial ordering on the set of
players, and to each such a tree a marginal vector corresponds at which a player receives
his marginal contribution when joining his successors in the tree. Considering maximal
strictly nested sets instead of permutations for games on building set systems is used in
[17] to define the gravity center, or GC-solution. Let us remark that implicitly maximal
strictly nested sets were used in [15] to define the average tree solution for communication
graph games and in [12] to define the Shapley value for union stable structures.
In [16] cooperative games are considered where the cooperation is restricted by a
directed graph. In a directed graph one player may dominate another player in the sense
that the first player is a predecessor of the other player but not reversely, while for two other
players it can happen that each one is a successor of the other. An example of the latter
case is the directed circular graph with three players, in which player 2 is an immediate
successor of player 1, player 3 of player 2, and player 1 of player 3. For such games in [16] a
collection of strictly nested sets is introduced being consistent with the underlying graph,
in the sense that if in the underlying directed graph a player dominates another player,
then the maximal strictly nested sets are such that the former player dominates the last
player in the corresponding trees. This domination of players over other players cannot be
always expressed by a set system alone. In the example of a circular directed graph game
with three players the set system of connected subsets is the collection of all subsets of the
set of players, but the same system is also the set system that underlies the TU game on
the complete undirected graph.
In this paper we introduce the concept of quasi-building set as set system that may
underly the coalitional structure of a cooperative game with restricted communication
between the players. Each feasible coalition, including the set of all players, contains a
nonempty subset called the choice set of the coalition. Only players that are in the choice
set of a coalition are able to join to other feasible coalitions to form the coalition and are
able to obtain a marginal contribution. Moreover, to have a quasi-building set, the set of
remaining players of the coalition has a unique maximal partition into one or more feasible
subcoalitions and any union of nonempty subsets of two or more partition members is not a
feasible coalition. If the choice set of each admissible coalition coincides with itself, then we
obtain a building set system. For the circular graph game example above, every player is
in the choice set of the set of all three players, but the choice set for the coalition consisting
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of players 1 and 2 contains only player 1, the one of players 2 and 3 only contains player
2, and the one for players 1 and 3 only contains player 3. In general, for a directed graph
the choice set of a connected subset contains all players in the coalition that are not being
dominated within the coalition by any other player in the coalition. For an undirected
graph, including the complete graph, every player of a feasible coalition belongs to the
choice set of the coalition.
Every quasi-building set determines a nonempty collection of maximal strictly nested
sets and each such set induces a rooted tree satisfying that every node of the tree is a player
that is in the choice set of the feasible coalition that consists of himself and all his successors
in the tree. Each tree corresponds to a marginal vector of the underlying game at which
each player gets as payoff his marginal contribution when he joins his successors in the tree.
As solution concept of a quasi-building set game we propose the average marginal vector
value, being the average of the marginal vectors that correspond to the trees induced by all
maximal strictly nested sets of the quasi-building set. The average marginal vector value
satisfies efficiency, linearity, the null player property, the inessential coalition property and
the closed coalition property. The fourth property says that the solution should not change
if an inessential coalition becomes infeasible, where a feasible coalition of a quasi-building
set is said to be inessential if it is not a member of any partitioning in the set system or if it
is a member then of a maximal partition of a set that is obtained after deleting a player in
the choice set of a feasible coalition that is also inessential. The closed coalition property
says that any non-inessential feasible coalition whose players are not in the choice set of
any non-inessential coalition that contains the coalition should obtain its worth. The idea
is that a closed coalition can not contribute other than its own worth.
We also consider several subclasses of quasi-building sets and give for each of them
convexity-type of conditions under which the average marginal vector value is an element
of the core and therefore cannot be blocked by any feasible coalition. Weakly union-
closed quasi-building sets are quasi-building sets that are weakly union closed, in the sense
that the union of two non-disjoint feasible coalitions is also feasible if at least one of the
intersecting players is in the choice set of one or both coalitions. For such a quasi-building
set the convexity condition only has to hold for any pair of union-closed coalitions. For
posets ([13]) and directed or undirected graphs ([18, 16]), the collection of connected sets
of players with as choice set the set of undominated players within the set is a weakly
union-closed quasi-building set. Mixed or directed graphs can not always be represented
by set systems alone, in particular not when the graph contains directed cycles. Also set
systems like partition systems ([3]), or building sets ([17]), augmenting systems ([5]) and
antimatroids ([10]) induce weakly union-closed quasi-building sets, where the choice set of
a feasible coalition is just the set of players for which the set of remaining players can be
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uniquely maximal partitioned.
Further, the class of intersection-closed quasi-building sets is studied. It holds for
an intersection-closed quasi-building set that if the intersection of two feasible coalitions is
nonempty, then this intersection is also a feasible coalition and, moreover, if a player is in
the choice set of some feasible coalition then this player must be in the choice set of any
feasible subcoalition that also contains the player. The latter property is related to the
independence of irrelevant alternatives in bargaining solutions and is called the heredity
property, Chernoff property, or α-axiom of Sen. For this class of quasi-building sets the
convexity condition only has to hold for any pair of strongly union-closed coalitions. For a
convex geometry as set system it holds that the induced quasi-building set defined in the
same way as for augmenting systems is an intersection-closed quasi-building set. However,
if for both these set systems the choice set of a feasible coalition is restricted to those
players for which the remaining players in the set form a single feasible coalition, a chain
quasi-building set is obtained, the third class of quasi-building sets we discuss. For a chain
quasi-building set it holds for every player in the choice set of a feasible coalition that
the set of remaining players is also a feasible coalition. All maximal strictly nested sets
of a chain quasi-building set are maximal chains and reversely. In case convex geometries
or augmenting systems are described in this way by chain quasi-building sets the average
marginal vector value coincides with the Shapley value in [5] and [7].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 quasi-building sets are introduced.
In Section 3 the average marginal vector value for games on quasi-building sets is defined
and properties of the new value are discussed. Subclasses of quasi-building sets and their
core stability are studied in Section 4 and special cases of quasi-building sets are treated
in Section 5.
2 Quasi-building sets
Let [n] = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set for some fixed integer n, n ≥ 2. A set system on [n] is
a subset of 2[n]. A quasi-building set on [n] is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 A pair Q = (H, U) is a quasi-building set on [n] if it satisfies the following
conditions:
(Q1) H is a set system on [n] containing both ∅ and [n] and U : H → 2[n] is a choice
function, that is for every H ∈ H \ {∅} it holds that U(H) 6= ∅ and U(H) ⊆ H.
(Q2) For every H ∈ H and h ∈ U(H), there exists a unique maximal partition P (H \
{h}) = {S1, . . . , Sk} of the set H \ {h} for some k ≥ 1 satisfying Sj ∈ H for j =
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1, . . . , k, and for every J ⊆ {1, . . . , k} with |J | ≥ 2 this partition satisfies ∪j∈JTj /∈ H
for any nonempty Tj ⊆ Sj, j ∈ J.
A quasi-building set consists of a set system and a choice function on the set system,
a mapping that assigns to every nonempty feasible set of the set system a choice set, being
a nonempty subset of the set (condition (Q1)). Condition (Q2) is a kind of consistency,
saying that for every feasible set of the set system and element in its choice set there exists
a unique maximal partition of the remaining elements of the set into members of the set
system, and no union of subsets of the sets in the partition is a member of the set system.
Notice that for a given set system there may exist several choice functions which satisfy
condition (Q2). One can easily check that for a given set system H on [n] the collection
of feasible choice functions is stable under union, where the union U1 ∪ U2 for two choice
functions U1 and U2 is defined by (U1 ∪ U2)(H) = U1(H) ∪ U2(H), H ∈ H.
Given a set system H, let 1(H) = H for any H ∈ H be the identical choice function.
It is shown that partition systems, or building sets, a class of set systems introduced in
[3, 17], is the only class of set systems that takes the form of quasi-building sets with the
identical choice function. A set system H is a building set on [n] if it satisfies the following
conditions:
(B1) H is a set system on [n] containing both ∅ and [n].
(B2) If S, T ∈ H with S ∩ T 6= ∅, then S ∪ T ∈ H.
(B3) For all i ∈ [n], {i} ∈ H.
Proposition 2.2 (H,1) is a quasi-building set on [n] if and only if H is a building set on
[n].
Proof. Suppose (H,1) is a quasi-building set on [n]. (B1) obviously holds. Let S, T ∈ H
with S ∩ T 6= ∅. If S ∪ T = [n], then (B2) is verified. Suppose S ∪ T 6= [n]. Let
j ∈ [n] \ (S ∪ T ). Then, because of (Q2) and j ∈ U([n]) since U = 1, S ∪ T is contained in
a single member of the partition P ([n] \ {j}). Let R be this set. If S ∪ T = R then (B2) is
verified. Otherwise take j′ ∈ R\ (S∪T ), then again by (Q2) and U = 1, we get that S∪T
belongs to a single member of the partition P (R \ {j′}), and so on. At some step, we get
S ∪T ∈ H and (B2) is verified. For verifying (B3), take any i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [n] \ {i}. Then
there is some S ∈ P ([n] \ {j}) containing i and take j′ ∈ S \ {i}. Then take a member of
P (S \ {j′}) containing i, and so on, until we get {i} ∈ H.
For the reverse implication, let H be a building set and consider (H,1). Condition
(Q1) comes from condition (B1) and the supposition U(H) = H. For condition (Q2),
it is to show that there exists a unique maximal feasible partition of H \ {h} for any
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H ∈ H and h ∈ H. Take any H ∈ H. Due to (B3), there is a feasible partition of
H \ {h} for any h ∈ H, and therefore there is a maximal one. If {{i} | i ∈ [n]} is
a maximal partition, then it must be unique. Suppose a maximal feasible partition of
H \ {h}, denoted as the set of feasible coalitions S, is not unique. Then there is another
maximal feasible partition, say, T , of H \ {h}. Since S 6= T , there exists an S ∈ S
such that S * T for all T ∈ T . Otherwise S cannot be a maximal partition. Now
consider a subset T S of T , T S = {T ∈ T | T ∩ S 6= ∅}. Then it follows from (B2)
that S ∪ (
⋃
T∈T S T ) =
⋃
T∈T S T ∈ H, which is a contradiction and therefore the maximal
partition is unique. Finally, it is to see that any union of nonempty subsets of elements in
the maximal partition can not be feasible. Let P (H \ {h}) = {S1, . . . , Sk} be the unique
maximal partition of H \ {h}, and suppose there exists J ⊆ {1, . . . , k} with |J | ≥ 2 and
some nonempty Tj ⊆ Sj, j ∈ J, such that T = ∪j∈JTj ∈ H. Then from (B2), it must hold
that (∪j∈JSj) ∪ T ∈ H, since T ∩ Sj 6= ∅ for all j ∈ J, which contradicts that {S1, . . . , Sk}
is a maximal partition. 2
An important property of a quasi-building set is that it contains maximal strictly
nested sets. For a quasi-building set a strictly nested set is a generalization of nested sets
for building sets, see [8],[17],[19], and is defined as follows.
Definition 2.3 A set system N on [n] is a strictly nested set in a quasi-building set
Q = (H, U) on [n] if it satisfies the following conditions:
(N1) For any different S, T ∈ N either S ⊂ T or T ⊂ S or S ∩ T = ∅.
(N2) For any collection of k, k ≥ 2, disjoint nonempty subsets T1, . . . , Tk in N it holds
that
T ′1 ∪ · · · ∪ T ′k 6∈ H
for any nonempty T ′j ⊆ Tj, j = 1, . . . , k.
(N3) For any h ∈ [n] there exists H in N such that h ∈ U(H) and H is a minimal set in
N containing h.
(N4) N contains [n].
Condition (N1) says that any two different sets of a strictly nested set in a quasi-
building set are either disjoint or one is a subset of the other. A set satisfying this property
is also known in the literature as laminar or hierarchy, see, for example, [14]. Condition
(N2) gives the strength of the nested property, see, for example, [8]. It says that the union
of subsets of disjoint sets of a strictly nested set cannot be a member of the underlying set
system. Condition (N3) says that for any element in [n] there exists a minimal set in the
strictly nested set such that this element is in the choice set of this set. Together with the
first condition this minimal set is unique. Condition (N4) reqires that any strictly nested
set contains [n].
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A strictly nested set N in a quasi-building set Q = (H, U) on [n] is maximal if it
contains n different nonempty sets of the set system H. To every maximal strictly nested
set N in Q there corresponds a (rooted) tree TN with vertex set [n]. Given a maximal
strictly nested set N and element i ∈ [n], let the set FN (i) be the unique minimal element
of N containing i, then in the tree TN the set FN (i) will be the set of subordinates of i
including i and element j ∈ [n] belongs to the set SN (i) of successors of i if FN (j) is a
maximal subset of FN (i)\{i} in N . A tree TN describes how the set [n] can be constructed
by letting its nodes join to their sets of subordinates. Any element i ∈ [n] constructs the
feasible set FN (i) in the maximal strictly nested set N by joining to all the feasible sets
FN (j), j ∈ SN (i), that are constructed by his successors in the tree. These latter sets
form a maximal partition of the set of subordinates of i (Q2) and satisfy that no union of
subsets is a feasible set of the underlying set system (N2), i.e., these sets or any of their
subsets are not able to construct a feasible set without i. The root of the tree compiles
the whole set [n], also being a feasible set (Q1), by joining to all feasible sets that are
constructed by its successors. An element is allowed to construct a feasible set only if it
belongs to the choice set of that set. The collection of maximal strictly nested sets in a
quasi-building set describes all different possibilities in which the set [n] can be compiled
in this way. The collection of maximal strictly nested sets of a quasi-building set Q on
[n] is denoted by M(Q). The next theorem shows that any quasi-building set contains at
least one maximal strictly nested set.
Theorem 2.4 Let Q be a quasi-building set on [n], then M(Q) 6= ∅.
Proof. Let Q = (H, U). We first construct a tree T on the vertex set [n] as follows. From
(Q1) it follows that [n] ∈ H and U([n]) 6= ∅. As root of T we take any element r ∈ U([n]).
According to (Q2) there exists a unique maximal partition S1, . . . , Sk of [n] \ {r} for some
k ≥ 1 such that Sj ∈ H for all j = 1, . . . , k. In each Sj, j = 1, . . . , k, there exists according
to (Q1) an element rj ∈ U(Sj), which we connect to the root r, i.e., in T each node rj
is a successor of the root r, j = 1, . . . , k. Again, for each j = 1, . . . , k, by (Q2) there
exists a unique maximal partition Sj,1, . . . , Sj,kj of Sj \ {rj} such that Sj,h ∈ H and by
(Q1) U(Sj,h) 6= ∅ for h = 1, . . . , kj, and we let rj be the root of the subtree of T for the
restriction of the quasi-building set Q on the set Sj, and so on. In this way, we obtain a
rooted tree T on [n] directed from the root. The collection of sets of subordinates F (i),
i ∈ [n], being the principal ideals of T , form a maximal strictly nested set N in Q, i.e.,
N = {F (i)| i ∈ [n]}. 2
The next two examples show that a same set system with different choice functions
may lead to different sets of maximally strictly nested sets.
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Example 2.5 Consider the quasi-building set Q = (H, U) on {1, 2, 3} where H = 2[n] and
U(H) = H for all H ∈ H. There are six maximal strictly nested sets, corresponding to all
six line-trees on [n].
Example 2.6 Consider the quasi-building set Q = (H, U) on {1, 2, 3} where H = 2[n]
and U({i}) = {i}, for i = 1, 2, 3, U({1, 2}) = {1}, U({1, 3}) = {3}, U({2, 3}) = {2},
U([n]) = [n]. There are three maximal strictly nested sets, N1 = {{1}, {1, 3}, {1, 2, 3}},
N2 = {{2}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}}, and N3 = {{3}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}, where N1 corresponds to
the line-tree TN1 = {(2, 3), (3, 1)} having element 2 as root, N2 corresponds to the line-
tree TN2 = {(3, 1), (1, 2)} having element 3 as root, and N3 corresponds to the line-tree
TN3 = {(1, 2), (2, 3)} having element 1 as root. Note that {{1}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}} is not a
maximal strictly nested set because 2 /∈ U({1, 2}).
3 The average marginal vector value
Let Q = (H, U) be a quasi-building set on [n] and v : H → R a function such that v(∅) = 0.
We consider H as a coalition structure on a set of n players and v as a characteristic
function of a cooperative game with v(H), H ∈ H, the worth of feasible coalition H. In
the remaining of this paper we identify a cooperative game with its characteristic function.
The pair (v,Q) is a quasi-building set game on [n]. The collection of all quasi-building set
games on [n] is denoted by V . A value is a mapping f from V to R[n], assigning the payoff
vector f(v,Q) to any game (v,Q) ∈ V .
As solution concept for quasi-building set games we propose the average of the
marginal vectors of all maximal strictly nested sets in the quasi-building set. Given a
quasi-building set game (v,Q) ∈ V , for a maximal strictly nested set N ∈ M(Q) the
marginal vector mN (v,Q) ∈ R[n] is defined by
mNi (v,Q) = v(FN (i))−
∑
j∈SN (i)
v(FN (j)), i ∈ [n],
where, for any h ∈ [n], FN (h) is the set of subordinates of h including h and SN (h) is
the set of successors of h in the tree TN corresponding to N . At a marginal vector of a
maximal strictly nested set every player receives as payoff what he contributes when he
joins his subordinates in the corresponding tree.
Definition 3.1 On the class of quasi-building set games V the Average Marginal Vector
Value, or AMV-value, assigns to every quasi-building set game (v,Q) ∈ V the payoff vector






The AMV-value of a quasi-building set game is the average of the marginal vectors induced
by all maximal strictly nested sets in the quasi-building set. The AMV-value is well
defined on the class of quasi-building set games, since according to Theorem 2.4 every
quasi-building set has at least one maximal strictly nested set.
We next discuss some properties of the AMV-value. The first two properties are
standard.
Definition 3.2 A value f on V satisfies efficiency if for all (v,Q) ∈ V it holds that∑
i∈[n]
fi(v,Q) = v([n]).
An efficient value generates for any quasi-building set game a payoff vector which allocates
the worth of the grand coalition among players.
Proposition 3.3 The AMV-value satisfies efficiency.
Proof. Let (v,Q) ∈ V be a quasi-building set game. It suffices to show that the marginal
vector of any maximal strictly nested set of Q is efficient, since the AMV-value is the



















since for each j ∈ FN (i), j 6= i, there is precisely one element k ∈ FN (i) such that k is a
successor of j in the corresponding tree TN . From (N4) it holds that [n] ∈ N and there





mNi (v,Q) = v(FN (r)) = v([n]).
2
Let Q = (H, U) be a quasi-building set system on [n]. For any two quasi-building
set games (v,Q) and (w,Q) in V and a, b ∈ R the quasi-building set game (av + bw,Q) is
defined by (av + bw)(H) = av(H) + bw(H) for all H ∈ H.
Definition 3.4 A value f on V satisfies linearity if for any quasi-building set games (v,Q)
and (w,Q) in V and a, b ∈ R it holds that
f(av + bw,Q) = af(v,Q) + bf(w,Q).
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Proposition 3.5 The AMV-value satisfies linearity.
Proof. Let (v,Q) and (w,Q) be two quasi-building set games a quasi-building set Q =
(H, U), let a, b ∈ R be given, and consider the quasi-building set game (av+ bw,Q). Since
those three games are on the same quasi-building set, the collection of all maximal strictly
nested sets,M(Q), is identical for them. Clearly, for each N ∈M(Q) and i ∈ [n] it holds
that
mNi (av + bw,Q) = (av + bw)(FN (i))−
∑
j∈SN (i)








= amNi (v,Q) + bmNi (w,Q).
2
Since maximal strictly nested sets consist of feasible coalitions that satisfy particular
properties, there may exist coalitions that are feasible but are not an element of any max-
imal strictly nested set. Such a coalition is inessential in the sense that neither feasibility
nor its worth affects the AMV-value.
Definition 3.6 Given a quasi-building set Q = (H, U), a coalition H ∈ H is inessential
if H ∈ ∪nk=1Ik, where In, . . . , I1 are recursively defined as follows:
1. In = ∅;
2. For k = n − 1, . . . , 1, H ∈ Ik if |H| = k and for every T ∈ H \ (∪nh=k+1Ih) such
that H ⊂ T it holds that H /∈ P (T \ {i}) for all i ∈ U(T ).
An inessential coalition of a quasi-building set is a feasible coalition that can be only
a member of a maximal partition of a set which is obtained after deleting a player in the
choice set from an inessential coalition. The collection of inessential coalitions is defined
recursively, since subsets of an inessential coalition may not be inessential.
Example 3.7 Consider the quasi-building set Q(G) = (H, U) on {1, 2} where H =
{{1}, {2}, {1, 2}} and U({1}) = {1}, U({2}) = {2}, U({1, 2}) = {1}. There is one max-
imal strictly nested set N = {{2}, {1, 2}}. The singleton {1} is an inessential coalition,
since 2 /∈ U({1, 2}).
The main property of an inessential coalition is that it does not show up in any maximal
strictly nested set of the underlying quasi-building set. Let I(Q) denote the collection of
inessential coalitions of a quasi-building set Q.
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Lemma 3.8 Let Q = (H, U) be a quasi-building set on [n] and H ∈ H. Then H /∈ N for
any maximal strictly nested set N ∈M(Q) if and only if H ∈ I(Q).
Proof. Suppose H ∈ I(Q) and H is an element of some maximal strictly nested set
N ∈ M(Q). Then from conditions (N1) and (N4) it holds that there exists a unique
minimal H1 ∈ N containing H. From (N3) and because H ∈ N , there exists h1 ∈ H1 \H
with h1 ∈ U(H1) such that H ∈ P (H1 \ {h1}), which would be a contradiction unless
H1 ∈ I(Q). If H1 ∈ I(Q), by following the same argument there exists H2 ∈ N , H2 ⊃ H1,
and some h2 ∈ U(H2) with H1 ∈ P (H2 \{h2}). Then it must hold that H2 ∈ I(Q) to avoid
the contradiction, and so on. Since the player set is finite and [n] /∈ I(Q), we obtain a finite
sequence of feasible coalitions (H1, . . . , Hm) for some m < n satisfying H1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Hm,
Hm−1 ∈ I(Q) and Hm /∈ I(Q), whereas Hm−1 ∈ P (Hm \ {hm}) for some hm ∈ U(Hm),
which is a contradiction.
Next, suppose H /∈ I(Q), then there exists H1 ∈ H \ I(Q) such that H ∈ P (H1 \
{h1}) for some h1 ∈ U(H1). Since H1 is not inessential, there exists H2 ∈ H \ I(Q) such
that H1 ∈ P (H2 \ {h2}) for some h2 ∈ U(H2), and so on. Since the player set is finite,
there is a finite sequence of players (h1, . . . , hm) and feasible sets (H1, . . . , Hm) for some
m < n such that Hm = [n] and Hj−1 ∈ P (Hj \ {hj}) for j = 1, . . . ,m. Then as done in
the proof of Theorem 2.4 we may construct a tree T on [n] having player hm as root and
containing (hj, hj−1) for j = 2, . . . ,m as directed links. Then T corresponds to a strictly
maximal nested set N of Q with H ∈ N . 2
An inessential coalition of a quasi-building set is a feasible coalition that does not
appear in any maximal partition and therefore an inessential coalition is not an element of
any maximal strictly nested set. The inessential coalition property of a quasi-building set
is defined as follows.
Definition 3.9 A value f on the class of quasi-building set games V satisfies the inessential
coalition property if for every (v,Q) ∈ V with Q = (H, U) and any inessential coalition
I ∈ I(Q) it holds that f(v,Q) = f(v, (H \ {I}, U)).
This property states that an allocation is independent of feasibility of any inessential coali-
tion and therefore is also independent of the worths of inessential coalitions. Therefore we
have the next corollary.
Corollary 3.10 A value f on the class of quasi-building set games V satisfies the inessen-
tial coalition property if and only if for any (v,Q), (w,Q) ∈ V such that v(H) = w(H) for
all H ∈ H \ I(Q), it holds that f(v,Q) = f(w,Q).
The AMV-value on the class of quasi-building set games satisfies this property, since
according to Lemma 3.8 the collection of maximal strictly nested sets of a quasi-building
set does not change by deleting or adding inessential coalitions or changing their worths.
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Proposition 3.11 The AMV-value satisfies the inessential coalition property.
While an inessential coalition never shows up in any maximal strictly nested set,
there might also be feasible coalitions that are members of every maximal strictly nested
set. Such a coalition is called a closed coalition of the quasi-building set.
Definition 3.12 Given a quasi-building set Q = (H, U), a coalition H ∈ H is a closed
coalition if for every T ∈ H \ I(Q) satisfying H ⊂ T it holds for all i ∈ U(T ) that there
exists S ∈ P (T \ {i}) such that H ⊆ S.
A closed coalition of a quasi-building set is a feasible coalition whose players are not selected
by the choice function of any non-inessential feasible coalition that contains the set. Notice
that the grand coalition [n] is by definition a closed coalition. Since members of a closed
coalition can never contribute to other coalitions their total payoff should be equal to the
worth of the coalition.
Definition 3.13 A value f on the class of quasi-building set games V satisfies the closed
coalition property if for every (v,Q) ∈ V with Q = (H, U) and closed coalition H ∈ H it
holds that
∑
i∈H fi(v,Q) = v(H).
An allocation that satisfies the closed coalition property gives as total payoff to the players
who form a closed coalition exactly the worth of the coalition. Since the grand coalition is
a closed coalition, this property implies efficiency.
Proposition 3.14 The AMV-value satisfies the closed coalition property.
Proof. Let (v,Q) ∈ V be a quasi-building set game with Q = (H, U) and H ∈ H a closed
coalition. Suppose H /∈ N for some N ∈M(Q). From condition (N3) and because H /∈ N ,
there exist i ∈ H and T ∈ N such that i ∈ U(T ) and H ⊂ T . This implies that there is
no S ∈ P (T \ {i}) such that S ⊇ H, which is a contradiction since H is a closed coalition.
Since the AMV-value is the average of the marginal vectors corresponding to all maximal




j (v,Q) = v(H) for any N ∈ M(Q).






mNj (v,Q) = v(FN (i)) = v(H).
2
The null player property is a widely known concept. In a standard TU-game, a
player is a null player if he never contributes to the worth of a coalition by joining to it.
For a quasi-building set game, however, a player may not join to all coalitions due to the
underlying restricted set system and choice function. A null player for a quasi-building set
game is defined as follows.
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Definition 3.15 Given a quasi-building set game (v,Q) ∈ V with Q = (H, U), player





Notice that the definition of a null player depends not only on the set system but also the
choice function. The definition of a null player can be weakened by restricting H ∈ H to
the set of feasible coalitions that are not inessential. Null players contribute nothing and
should receive zero payoff.
Definition 3.16 A value f on the class of quasi-building set games V satisfies the null
player property if for every (v,Q) ∈ V it holds that fi(v,Q) = 0 for any null player i ∈ [n].
Proposition 3.17 The AMV-value satisfies the null player property.
Proof. Let (v,Q) ∈ V be a quasi-building set game with Q = (H, U) and null player
i ∈ [n]. Since the AMV-value is the average of the marginal vectors corresponding to all
maximal strictly nested sets, it suffices to show that mNi (v,Q) = 0 for all N ∈ M(Q).
Take any N ∈ M(Q). Since FN (i) is the minimum set in N containing i, it follows from
condition (N3) that i ∈ U(FN (i)). By condition (Q2), P (FN (i)\{i}) is the unique partition
of FN (i) \ {i}, and thus P (FN (i) \ {i}) = {FN (j) | j ∈ SN (i)}. Since i is a null player, it
follows that









4 Subclasses of quasi-building sets
In this section we discuss several special cases of quasi-building sets in relation to previous
studies on TU-games with communication restriction. The situations that are covered in
this section are restrictions expressed by communication graphs, directed or undirected,
and by set systems such as augmenting systems and convex geometries. For such situations
the AMV-value is well defined for specific quasi-building sets with appropriately defined
choice functions. For each subclass, a convexity condition under which the AMV-value of
the game lies in the core, will be given.
The core of a game is the set of efficient and stable payoff vectors. On the class of
quasi-building set games the core is defined as follows.
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Definition 4.1 Let (v,Q) ∈ V be a quasi-building set game, where Q = (H, U), then the
core of the game (v,Q) is given by the set
C(v,Q) = {x ∈ Rn| x([n]) = v([n]), x(H) ≥ v(H), H ∈ H}.
The core reflects the property that only coalitions that are feasible are able to block
a payoff vector.
4.1 Weakly union-closed quasi-building sets
In this subsection we consider the subclass of weakly union-closed quasi-building sets.
Definition 4.2 A pair Q = (H, U) is a weakly union-closed quasi-building set on [n] if Q
is a quasi-building set and the following holds:
(Q3) For any H1 ∈ H \ I(Q) and H2 ∈ H satisfying U(H1) ∩ H2 6= ∅ it holds that
H1 ∪H2 ∈ H.
Condition (Q3) says that the union of two sets in the set system, at least one of two
is non-inessential, is also in the set system if their intersection is nonempty and some
element in the intersection is contained in the choice set of a non-inessential set. The
conditions together imply that in each feasible set H of the underlying set system of a
quasi-building set there is a nonempty subset, which could be the set itself, for which it
holds that each element in this subset is able to join in a unique way disjoint sets in the set
system to form H (condition (Q2)) and, when H is also non-inessential, for each element
in this subset the union of H and any other set in the set system, to which the element
also belongs, is a feasible set (condition (Q3)). Note that condition (Q3) is weaker than
the weak union-closedness condition for set systems. The existence of maximal strictly
nested sets is not violated by requiring (Q3), since this condition demands the underlying
set system to be richer. In the next section we demonstrate that weakly union closed
quasi-building set games cover games with a communication graph (undirected, directed
or mixed), augmenting systems, and posets.
Next we discuss conditions under which the AMV-value is stable on the class of
weakly union-stable quasi-building sets.
Definition 4.3 Given a weakly union-closed quasi-building set Q = (H, U), a pair (A,B)
of subsets of [n] is union-closed if A ∈ H and there exists i ∈ A \ B such that B ∪ {i} ∈
H \ I(Q) and i ∈ U(B ∪ {i}).
A feasible coalition A and a possibly infeasible coalition B of a weakly union-closed
quasi-building set is union-closed if there exists a player in A outside B such that when
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this player, say player i, would join the players in B the resulting coalition C = B ∪ {i} is
non-inessential and contains player i in its choice set. Note that A∪B ∈ H because of (Q3).
Player i ∈ A ∩ C is as member of the choice set of C able to connect the non-inessential
coalition C to the feasible coalition A to form the feasible coalition A ∪ B. A convexity
condition for the games on this class of quasi-building set is defined on union-closed pairs
of underlying quasi-building set as follows.
Definition 4.4 Let Q = (H, U) be a weakly union-closed quasi-building set on [n]. A
function f : H → R is Q-supermodular if for any union-closed pair (A,B) and maximal








Notice that condition (Q2) implies that the set B has a unique maximal partition
P (B). Since the maximal partition of the intersection into feasible coalitions may not be
unique, the condition should hold for all such maximal partitions. The next example shows
that, for a union-closed pair, a maximal partition of its intersection into feasible coalitions
may not be unique.
Example 4.5 Consider a quasi-building set Q = (H, U) on {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, where H =
{{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 5}, {1, 2}, {2, 3}, {1}, . . . , {5}} and the choice function is
such that U({1, 2, 3, 4, 5}) = {4, 5}, U({1, 2, 3, 4}) = {1}, U({1, 2, 3, 5}) = {3}, U({1, 2}) =
{1}, U({2, 3}) = {3}, U({i}) = {i}, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. This Q is weakly union-closed, and
there are two maximal strictly nested sets, N1 = {{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 5}, {1, 2}, {2}, {5}}
and N2 = {{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 4}, {2, 3}, {2}, {4}}. The pair (A,B) with A = {1, 2, 3, 4}
and B = {1, 2, 3, 5} is union-closed. Their intersection A ∩B = {1, 2, 3} has two maximal
partitions into feasible coalitions, namely {{1}, {2, 3}} and {{1, 2}, {3}}.
In the next theorem it is shown that the Q-supermodularity is a sufficient condition
for the stability of the AMV-value.
Theorem 4.6 Let (v,Q) ∈ V be a weakly union-closed quasi-building set game. If the
characteristic function v is Q-supermodular, then the core C(v,Q) contains the AMV-
value.
Proof. We show that for every maximal strictly nested set N ∈ M(Q) and coalition
H ∈ H it holds that∑
j∈H
mNj (v,Q) ≥ v(H). (2)
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Since the AMV-value is efficient and the core is a convex set this implies that the AMV-
value is in the core.
Take anyN ∈M(Q) and H ∈ H. Let H1, . . . , Hs be the maximal connected subsets
of H in the tree TN corresponding to N . For k = 1, . . . , s denote Hk = {ik1, . . . , iktk} and
let h < l if ikh ∈ FN (ikl ). For k = 1, . . . , s denote rk = iktk and let h < l if rh ∈ F
N (rl).
Since TN is a tree, rk is the root of the subtree of T
N on FN (rk) containing the set Hk,
k = 1, . . . , s. Moreover, FN (rs) contains the set H and also F
N (rk), k = 1, . . . , s−1. Since

























To show that the latter expression is at least or equal to v(H), define Ik = H∪(∪kh=1FN (rh))
for k = 0, . . . , s and Ikh = I
k−1 ∪ (∪hj=1FN (ikj )) for h = 0, . . . , tk, k = 1, . . . , s. Notice





k. We first show by induction that Ikh ∈ H for all h = 0, . . . , tk, k = 1, . . . , s. Since
I10 = I
0 = H it holds that I10 ∈ H. Suppose I1h ∈ H for some h < t1. Since FN (i1h) ∈ H
and i1h ∈ H ∩ U(FN (i1h)) ⊆ I1h ∩ U(FN (i1h)), it follows from condition (Q3) that the union
I1h+1 of the sets I
1
h and F
N (i1h+1) is in H. In particular, this implies for h = t1 − 1 that I1t1
is in H. Since I1t1 = I
1 = I20 , it also holds that I
2
0 ∈ H. Continuing the same argument, we
obtain by induction that Ikh ∈ H for all k and h.
Let A = Ikh−1 and B = ∪j∈SN (ikh)F
N (j) for some h = 1, . . . , tk, k = 1, . . . , s. Then
A ∈ H and A ∪ B = Ikh ∈ H. It holds that ikh ∈ A \ B, ikh ∈ U(B ∪ {ikh}) and B ∪ {ikh} =
FN (ikh) ∈ N , and therefore B ∪ {ikh} ∈ H \ I(Q). Hence, the pair (A,B) is union-closed in
Q. Concerning the intersection of A and B, for j ∈ SN (ikh) \Hk define
Dkh(j) = {ri | FN (ri) ⊂ FN (j), 6 ∃l ∈ {i+1, . . . , k−1} with FN (ri) ⊂ FN (rl) ⊂ FN (j)}.
Then there is a partition of A ∩B into sets of H, namely
D = {FN (ri) | ri ∈ Dkh(j), j ∈ SN (ikh) \Hk} ∪ {FN (j) | j ∈ SN (ikh) ∩Hk}.
This partition is maximal, because every element of this partition is an element in the
maximal strictly nested set N and if this partition were not maximal, condition (N2)
would be violated. Therefore D is a maximal partition of A ∩ B into sets of H and the










Since P (B) ∩ D = {FN (j) | j ∈ SN (ikh) ∩Hk}, the terms indexed by these sets cancel on




























Since I10 = H, I
s
ts = F
N (rs) and each ri, i = 1, . . . , s − 1, belongs to precisely one Dkh(j)
















4.2 Intersection-closed quasi-building set
In this subsection we consider the subclass of intersection-closed quasi-building sets.
Definition 4.7 A pair Q = (H, U) is an intersection-closed quasi-building set on [n] if Q
is a quasi-building set and the following holds:
(Q4) For H1, H2 ∈ H satisfying H1 ∩H2 6= ∅, then H1 ∩H2 ∈ H.
(Q5) For H1, H2 ∈ H satisfying H1 ⊂ H2 and i ∈ U(H2) ∩H1, then i ∈ U(H1).
Condition (Q4) reflects the name of this subclass, as it is known as intersection-
closed condition, which is a particular condition convex geometries possess. Condition
(Q5) states that if a player is in the choice set of a feasible coalition, then he must be in
the choice set of a feasible coalition which is a subset of the coalition that contains this
player. This is in line with the property called independence of irrelevant alternatives or
α-axiom of Sen, or heredity axiom, as a choice for a feasible set remains a choice for any
smaller feasible set, as long as this choice is available. This property may not be compatible
with the union-closed quasi-building set. Regarding this respect, reconsider Example 2.6,
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which is an union-closed quasi-building set. For this example, (Q5) is not satisfied for
H1 = {1, 2} and H2 = [n]. In the next section we demonstrate that intersection-closed
quasi-building set games cover games with convex geometries.
For the class of intersection-closed quasi-building set games, a convexity condition
is defined as follows.
Definition 4.8 Let Q = (H, U) be an intersection-closed quasi-building set on [n]. A








for any S ∈ H \ I(Q), T ∈ H, T ⊂ S and i ∈ U(S) ∩ T .
A game on an intersection-closed quasi-building set is Q-convex if the marginal
loss caused by a player is greater whenever he is removed from a larger feasible and not
inessential coalition. This condition is in line with a convexity condition introduced in [6]
on the class of games on convex geometries.
Theorem 4.9 Let (v,Q) ∈ V be an intersection-closed quasi-building set game. If the
characteristic function v is Q-convex, then the core C(v,Q) contains the AMV-value.
Proof. Let N be a maximal nested set in Q and let Q = (H, U). We show that for every
H ∈ H it holds that∑
j∈H
mNj (v,Q) ≥ v(H). (4)
Denote H = {i1, . . . , is} and let h < l if ih ∈ FN (il) in the tree TN corresponding














From (Q4), the set Qk is feasible where Qk = F
N (ik) ∩ H, k = 1, . . . , s, since
FN (ik) ∈ H \ I(Q) and H ∈ H. It follows that Qs = H and Qk ⊂ H for k = 1, . . . , s− 1.
Moreover it holds for k = 1, . . . , s that ik ∈ U(FN (ik)) ∩ Qk, Qk ⊂ FN (ik). From (Q5) it
follows for k = 1, . . . , s that ik ∈ U(Qk) and thus P (Qk \{ik}) exists. Clearly, P (Qk \{ik})
consists of a set of Qjs with j < k, k = 1, . . . , s. Since the game is Q-convex we have






















Since Qs = H, the inequality becomes
∑
j∈H









The last two terms cancel out since ∪sk=1P (Qk \ {ik}) = {Q1, . . . , QS−1} and the desired
result follows. 2
With properly defined pairs of sets, strongly union-closed pairs, there is an equiv-
alent expression to Q-convexity. On the class of intersection-closed quasi-building set, a
strongly union-closed pair is defined as follows.
Definition 4.10 Given an intersection-closed quasi-building setQ = (H, U), a pair (A,B)
of subsets of [n] is strongly union-closed if A ∈ H, A ∪ B ∈ H \ I(Q), and there exists
i ∈ A \B such that B ∪ {i} ∈ H \ I(Q) and i ∈ U(A ∪B).
Note that the definition is different from Definition 4.3 of a union-closed pair on
the class of weakly union-closed quasi-building set. Now the condition requires that i ∈
U(A∪B). It then follows from (Q5) that i ∈ U(B ∪{i}) and P (B) exists. It also excludes
situations where the union A ∪ B is an inessential coalition. Due to the condition (Q4)
it holds that (A ∩ B) ∪ {i} = A ∩ (B ∪ {i}) ∈ H, and together with (Q5) it holds that
i ∈ U((A∩B)∪{i}) and P (A∩B) exists. Since i ∈ U(B∪{i}) does not imply i ∈ U(A∪B)
nor A ∪ B ∈ H \ I(Q), for a quasi-building set which is both weakly union-closed and
intersection-closed, a strongly union-closed pair is union-closed, but a union-closed pair is
not necessarily strongly union-closed.
Theorem 4.11 Let Q = (H, U) be an intersection-closed quasi-building set on [n]. A








holds for any strongly union-closed pair (A,B).
Proof. For the necessity, take any S ∈ H \ I(Q), T ∈ H, T ⊂ S and i ∈ U(S) ∩ T . Since
i ∈ U(S), the partition P (S \ {i}) exists. From (Q5) and i ∈ U(S) ∩ T , it holds that
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because of the fact that S ∪ T = S and (S \ {i}) ∩ T = T \ {i}.
For the sufficiency, take any strongly union-closed pair (A,B). The game v is Q-








since A ∪ B ∈ H \ I(Q), A ∈ H, A ⊂ A ∪ B and U(A ∪ B) ∩ A 6= ∅ for the pair (A,B).













For this purpose, we show by induction that there is a sequence (i1, . . . , ik) of all k












for h = 1, . . . , k.
First consider the case with h = 1. Take any X ∈ P (A ∪B \ {i1}) with X \B 6= ∅.
If there is no such X, it implies that A \ B = {i1} and therefore A ∩ B = A \ {i1} and
A∪B\{i1} = B, which leads to (6). Suppose there is such X. We show that U(X)\B 6= ∅.
Because B ∪ {i1} ∈ H \ I(Q) and i1 ∈ U(B ∪ {i1}), there exists a maximal strictly nested
set N with B∪{i1} ∈ N and P (B) ⊆ N . There also exists unique X ∈ N which minimally
covers X. It follows from B ∪ {i1} ∈ N , X \ B 6= ∅ and i1 /∈ X that B ∪ {i1} ( X. Since
X,B ∪ {i1} ∈ N , it holds that there exists i2 ∈ U(X) \ B with P (X \ {i2}) ⊆ N . This
means that i2 ∈ X, and thus i2 ∈ X \ B, because X minimally covers X. From (Q5) it
follows that i2 ∈ U(X) since X ⊃ X and i2 ∈ U(X) ∩X. There is unique S ∈ P (A \ {i1})
with i2 ∈ S and it must hold that S ⊂ X. From (Q5), it then holds that i2 ∈ U(S) and








since S ⊂ X, X ∈ H \ I(Q) and i2 ∈ U(X)∩S. Among the elements of P (A∪B \{i1}), i2
appears only in X and therefore P (A∪B \{i1, i2}) = (P (A∪B \{i1})\{X})∪P (X \{i2}).
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Also among the elements of P (A\{i}), i2 appears only in S and therefore P (A\{i1, i2}) =














































Since h < k − 1, there exists Y ∈ P (A ∪ B \ {i1, . . . , ih+1}) such that Y \ B 6= ∅. It is to
show that there exists ih+2 ∈ Y \ B such that ih+2 ∈ U(Y ). Consider a maximal strictly
nested set N such that B ∪ {i1} ∈ N and P (B) ⊆ N and take Y ∈ N that minimally
covers Y. Since Y ∈ P (A ∪ B \ {i1, . . . , ih+1}), Y \ B 6= ∅ and B ∪ {i1} ∈ N , it follows
that B ∪ {i1} ( Y . Since Y ,B ∪ {i1} ∈ N , it holds that there exists ih+2 ∈ U(Y ) \B with
P (Y \{ih+2}) ⊆ N . This means that ih+2 ∈ Y, and thus ih+2 ∈ Y \B, because Y minimally
covers Y. From (Q5) it follows that ih+2 ∈ U(Y ) since Y ⊃ Y and ih+2 ∈ U(Y ) ∩ Y. There
is unique T ∈ P (A \ {i1, . . . , ih+1}) with ih+2 ∈ T, and it holds that ih+2 ∈ U(T ), because








since T ⊂ Y, Y ∈ H \ I(Q) and ih+2 ∈ U(Y ) ∩ T. Among the elements of P (A ∪ B \
{i1, . . . , ih+1}), ih+2 appears only in Y and therefore P (A ∪ B \ {i1, . . . , ih+2}) = (P (A ∪
B \{i1, . . . , ih+1})\{Y })∪P (Y \{ih+2}). Also among the elements of P (A\{i1, . . . , ih+1}),
ih+2 appears only in T and therefore P (A\{i1, . . . , ih+2}) = (P (A\{i1, . . . , ih+1})\{T})∪






























































since A ∪B \ {i1, . . . , ik} = B and A \ {i1, . . . , ik} = A ∩B. 2
From the theorem it follows that on the subclass of games on quasi-building sets
that are both weakly union-closed and intersection-closed Q-supermodularity implies Q-
convexity. The next example shows aQ-convex weakly union-closed and intersection-closed
quasi-building set game which is not Q-supermodular.
Example 4.12 Consider a quasi-building set game (v,Q) withQ = (H, U) on {1, 2, 3, 4, 5},
where H = {{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3}, {2, 4}, {1}, {2}, {3}, {5}}, the choice func-
tion is such that U({1, 2, 3, 4, 5}) = {4}, U({1, 2, 3, 4}) = {4}, U({1, 2, 3}) = {2}, U({2, 4}) =
{4}, U({1}) = {1}, U({2}) = {2}, U({3}) = {3}, U({5}) = {5}, and the charac-
teristic function is such that v({1, 2, 3, 4, 5}) = 5, v({1, 2, 3, 4}) = 2, v({1, 2, 3}) = 2,
v({2, 4}) = 3, v({1}) = v({2}) = v({3}) = v({5}) = 0. Note that Q is both weakly union-
closed and intersection-closed, with {1, 2, 3, 4}, {2, 4} and {2} being inessential coalitions.
There is one maximal strictly nested set, N = {{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, {1, 2, 3}, {1}, {3}, {5}}, and
mN (v,Q) = (0, 2, 0, 3, 0) is in the core of the game. This game is Q-convex, but not
Q-supermodular (take the pair (A,B) with A = {2, 4} and B = {1, 3}).
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4.3 Chain quasi-building sets
In this subsection we consider the subclass of chain quasi-building sets.
Definition 4.13 A pair Q = (H, U) is a chain quasi-building set on [n] if it satisfies the
following conditions:
(Q1) H is a set system on [n] containing both ∅ and [n] and U : H → 2[n] is a choice
function, that is for every H ∈ H \ {∅} it holds that ∅ 6= U(H) ⊆ H.
(Q2)’ For every H ∈ H and h ∈ U(H), H \ {h} ∈ H.
Condition (Q2)’ comes from condition (Q2) and the one-point extension property, i.e., if
H ∈ H, H 6= [n], then there exists i ∈ [n] \ S such that S ∪ {i} ∈ H and i ∈ U(S ∪ {i}).
The next lemma shows that any maximal strictly nested set of a chain quasi-building set
is a maximal chain.
Lemma 4.14 Suppose Q = (H, U) is a chain quasi-building set on [n]. Then any max-
imal strictly nested set of Q is a maximal chain, i.e., it consists of n feasible coalitions
H1, . . . , Hn with H1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Hn.
Proof. Let N be a maximal strictly nested set of Q. Suppose that N is not a chain and
there exists H ∈ H and h ∈ U(H) such that P (H \ {h}) = {T1, . . . , Tk} with Tl ∈ N for
l = 1, . . . , k, for some k ≥ 2. Then (Q2)’ and h ∈ U(H) imply that H \ {h} ∈ H and
therefore T1 ∪ · · · ∪ Tk ∈ H, which contradicts that N is a maximal strictly nested set. 2
For the stability of the AMV-value on the class of chain quasi-building set games,
we introduce the following condition. Since every maximal strictly nested set is a chain,
the condition has a flavor of chains.
Definition 4.15 Let Q = (H, U) be a chain quasi-building set on [n]. A function f : H →
R is Q-chain-increasing if
k∑
i=1
(f(Si)− f(Si \Hi)) ≥ f(H)
holds for any H ∈ H and S1, . . . , Sk ∈ H \ I(Q) satisfying S1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Sk, H ⊂ Sk and
Si \Hi ∈ H \ I(Q), where Hi = (Si \ Si−1) ∩H 6= ∅, for all i = 1, . . . , k.
This condition states that the worth of a coalition is less than or equal to the sum of their
marginal contributions to any increasing sequence of non-inessential and feasible coalitions.
Theorem 4.16 Let (v,Q) ∈ V be a chain quasi-building set game on [n]. If the charac-
teristic function v is Q-chain-increasing, then the core C(v,Q) contains the AMV-value.
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Proof. Let Q = (H, U). We show that for every N ∈M(Q) and H ∈ H it holds that∑
j∈H
mNj (v,Q) ≥ v(H).
Take any N ∈M(Q) and H ∈ H. Let H1, . . . , Hk be the maximal connected subsets of H
in the tree TN corresponding to N . From Lemma 4.14, TN is a line-tree. Therefore for
each Hi, i = 1, . . . , k, there exists unique S
i ∈ N such that Hi ⊆ S
i
and there is no S ′ ∈ N
with Hi ⊆ S ′ ⊂ S
i
, and there exists unique Si ∈ N such that Hi ∩ Si = ∅ and there is
no S ′ ⊃ Si, S ′ ∈ N with Hi ∩ S ′ = ∅. Note that S
i \Hi = Si. For each i = 1, . . . , k, there
exists unique ri such that F
N (ri) = S
i
. It holds that ri ∈ Hi for i = 1, . . . , k, otherwise
there exists S ′ ∈ N such that Hi ⊆ S ′ ⊂ S
i
. There also exists unique ri ∈ Si such that
FN (ri) = S
i and it holds that ri /∈ H for i = 1, . . . , k. Note that Hi = FN (ri) \ FN (ri).
The sets S
i
, i = 1, . . . , k, can be ordered such that S
1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Sk and H ⊂ Sk. Therefore
S
1
, . . . , S
k
and H satisfy the condition for Q-chain-increasing. Note that Si /∈ I(Q) for
i = 1, . . . , k since S
i ∈ N . Also it holds that Si\Hi /∈ I(Q) for i = 1, . . . , k since S
i\Hi = Si
and Si ∈ N . Since TN is a line-tree and Hi = FN (ri) \ FN (ri), as marginal contribution,
















which is greater or equal to v(H) since v is Q-chain-increasing. 2
5 Special cases
In this section we discuss how a quasi-building set can be constructed when the underlying
communication structure has some standard properties, such as a collection of connected
subsets of a (directed) graph, or a combinatorial structure as augmenting systems, convex
geometries, and posets. When a communication situation is represented by a directed
graph, the choice function can be used to serve to represent the underlying dominance
relation. In case where a communication situation is expressed by certain set systems, the
choice function can be taken such that it induces precisely the collection of all maximal
strictly nested sets coming from the set system. A quasi-building set coming from any of
such special cases belongs to one of the subclasses studied in the previous section.
5.1 Graphical quasi-building set
A mixed graph G = (V,E) with E = L ∪ A ⊆ {(i, j) | i, j ∈ [n], i 6= j} on [n] consists of
a vertex set V equal to the set [n] and a set of edges E which is constituted from links
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L = {(i, j) ∈ E | (j, i) ∈ E)}, undirected edges, and arrows A = {(i, j) ∈ E | (j, i) /∈ E)},
a set of directed edges. A mixed graph without arrows is an undirected graph and a mixed
graph without links is a directed graph. Given a mixed graph G = (V,E) with E = L∪A,
the underlying undirected graph G = (V,E) is obtained by making from every arrow a
link. A graph (V,E) is a complete graph on [n] if A = ∅ and L = {(i, j) | i, j ∈ [n], i 6= j}.
Definition 5.1 Given a mixed graph G = (V,E) with E = L∪A on [n], the pair Q(G) =
(H, U) on [n] consists of a set system H and mapping U : H → 2[n] given by the following
conditions:
• H is the set of all connected subsets of G.
• U assigns to every H ∈ H a set of nodes which are undominated in the mixed
subgraph G(H) of G on H, being the set of nodes in H from which there is a
directed path in the subgraph G(H) to any of its predecessors in the set H.
Note that in case of an undirected graph all nodes in a connected subset are undominated.
Lemma 5.2 For a connected mixed graph G = (V,E) with E = L ∪ A on [n], Q(G) is a
weakly union-closed quasi-building set on [n].
Proof. Let Q(G) = (H, U). Since G is connected, and by definition the empty set is
connected, condition (Q1) is satisfied. For any nonempty H ∈ H, which is a finite set of
nodes being connected in G, there exists an undominated node in G(H), therefore U(H)
is a nonempty subset of H. Since G is a graph, for every h ∈ U(H) there exists a unique
maximal partition of H \ {h} into connected subsets of G. Also because G is a graph, any
union of nonempty subsets of at least two sets in such a maximal partition is not connected
in G and is therefore not an element of the set system H. Consequently, condition (Q2) is
also fulfilled. Condition (Q3) immediately follows since two connected subsets H1, H2 of
G satisfying H1 ∩H2 6= ∅ implies that H1 ∪H2 is connected in G. 2
For a connected graph G, Q(G) is called the graphical quasi-building set correspond-
ing to G.
Example 5.3 Consider a graph G = ([n], E) with n = 3 and E = A = {a1, a2, a3} where
a1 = (1, 2), a2 = (2, 3), and a3 = (3, 1), i.e., G is a directed circle. The set system under-
lying the graphical quasi-building set Q(G) = (H, U) corresponding to G is equal to H =
{∅, {1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}. Because every node is an undominated
node in {1, 2, 3}, U({1, 2, 3}) = {1, 2, 3}. For each doubleton there is only one node which
is undominated in it, U({1, 2}) = {1}, U({1, 3}) = {3}, and U({2, 3}) = {2}. By definition,
U({i}) = {i} for any i = 1, 2, 3. This Q(G) has three maximal strictly nested sets, namely
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N1 = {{1}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}}, N2 = {{2}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}, and N3 = {{3}, {1, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}.
Notice that this graph has the same set system underlying its graphical quasi-building set
as the complete graph does. For the complete graph, however, all vertices in any subset
are undominated in it and its graphical quasi-building set has six maximal strictly nested
sets.
The example stresses the fact that different connected mixed graphs may have the
same set system as a collection of connected subsets. The differences in dominance between
vertices within the graphs is expressed in the choice function by the property that the sets
of undominated vertices may differ.
Example 5.4 Reconsider Example 3.7, the following quasi-building set Q(G) = (H, U) on
[n] = 2 where H = {{1}, {2}, {1, 2}} and U({1}) = {1}, U({2}) = {2}, U({1, 2}) = {1}.
This is the quasi-building set corresponding to the directed graph G = (V,E) with n = 2
and E = A = {(1, 2)}.
This example shows that Q(G) constructed from Definition 5.1 may contain inessen-
tial coalitions (in this example, {1} is an inessential coalition). It is instead possible to
construct a quasi-building set which contains no inessential coalitions.
Definition 5.5 Given a mixed graph G = (V,E) with E = L∪A on [n], the pair Q(G) =
(H, U) on [n] consists of a set system H and mapping U : H → 2[n] given by the following
conditions:
• H is the set of all subsets of [n] where each of them is connected in G and there is
no directed link emanating from such a subset to vertices outside of it.
• U assigns to every H ∈ H a set of nodes which are undominated in the subgraph
G(H) of G on H, being the set of nodes in H from which there is a directed path in
the subgraph G(H) to any of its predecessors in the set H.
This Q(G) contains no inessential coalitions. As we see in the previous section, the AMV-
value of a quasi-building set game does not change with or without inessential coalitions,
but the core of the game does.
On the class of directed graph, the average covering tree value is introduced in [16] as
the average of marginal contribution vectors corresponds to the set of covering trees induced
from a graph. The AMV-value coincides with the average covering tree solution since the
set of trees induced from the collection of maximal strictly nested sets on a graphical quasi-
building set coincides with the collection of covering trees of the underlying graph, and
given a tree the marginal contribution vector is calculated in the same way.
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5.2 Set system quasi-building set
In this subsection we discuss quasi-building sets that can be constructed to extract the
collection of all maximal strictly nested sets when set systems like augmenting systems,
posets and convex geometries are the underlying set system.
Definition 5.6 Given a set system F on [n], the pair Q(F) = (H, U) consists of the set
system H and the mapping U : H → 2[n] given by the following conditions:
• H = F .
• U(H) = {i ∈ H | there exists a unique maximal partition of H \{i} satisfying (Q2)}.
The pair Q(F) consists of the original set system and the choice function is such that
for each feasible coalition, all players who can leave the coalition while satisfying the
consistency condition (Q2) can be chosen.
One of the concepts of set systems is augmenting systems, introduced in [4]. A set
system F on [n] is an augmenting system on [n] if it satisfies the following conditions:
(S1) ∅ ∈ F .
(S2) If S, T ∈ F with S ∩ T 6= ∅, then S ∪ T ∈ F .
(S3) If S, T ∈ F and S ⊂ T, then there exists i ∈ T \ S such that S ∪ {i} ∈ F .
An augmenting system is a set system satisfying (weak) union closedness (S2) and one-
point extension (S3). Note that a set system corresponding to an undirected graph is
an augmenting system. Antimatroids, another class of set systems, introduced in [10],
is a subclass of the class of augmenting systems. In [13], a restriction among players is
expressed as a precedence constraint, which is represented by a poset. Given a poset,
feasible coalitions are defined as the collection of ideals of the poset, which belongs to a
subclass of antimatroids, see [2].
Lemma 5.7 For an augmenting system F on [n] with [n] ∈ F , Q(F) is a weakly union-
closed quasi-building set on [n].
Proof. Let Q(F) = (H, U). Condition (Q1) is satisfied by assumption and condition
(S1). Condition (S2) implies condition (Q3). By definition U(H) ⊂ H. Regarding the
non-emptiness of the set U(H), it follows from conditions (S1) and (S3) with S = ∅, that
for any H ∈ H, there exists at least h ∈ H such that H \ {h} ∈ H. 2
The notion of convex geometry is introduced in [11]. Set system F is a convex
geometry on [n] if it satisfies the following conditions:
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(C1) ∅ ∈ F .
(C2) If S, T ∈ F then S ∩ T ∈ F .
(C3) If S ∈ F , S 6= [n], then there exists i ∈ [n] \ S such that S ∪ {i} ∈ F .
A convex geometry is a set system satisfying intersection closedness (C2) and another
form of one-point extension (C3). Note that a graph may not be expressed as a convex
geometry, since the collection of connected subgraphs of a graph may not satisfy intersection
closedness. Different from augmenting systems, the grand coalition [n] is necessarily feasible
by definition. Since union closedness does not imply intersection closedness and vice versa,
there is no inclusion relationship between the class of convex geometries and the class of
augmenting systems. We show in the following that if a quasi-building set is a convex
geometry, then it is an intersection-closed quasi-building set. First we show that it is a
quasi-building set.
Lemma 5.8 For a convex geometry F on [n], Q(F) is a quasi-building set on [n].
Proof. Let Q(F) = (H, U). Condition (Q1) follows from condition (C1) and the fact that
[n] ∈ F is implied by condition (C3). For condition (Q2), by definition of U(H) it suffices
to show that for any H ∈ F there exists i ∈ H such that a unique maximal partition
P (H \{i}) exists. First we show that for any H there exists h ∈ H such that H \{h} ∈ H.
Suppose there is no h ∈ H such that H \ {h} ∈ F . Since ∅ ∈ F , H cannot be a singleton
and therefore |H| ≥ 2. From (C3) and ∅ ∈ F , there is a sequence of n elements S1, . . . , Sn,
with |Sk| = k, Sk ∈ H, k = 1, . . . , n and S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Sn = [n]. Consider Sn−1 and
denote it as [n] \ {i1}. Then from (C2) it follows that i1 /∈ H, otherwise H ∩ ([n] \ {i1})
will be equal to H \ {i1} ∈ H, which contradicts the supposition. Next, consider Sn−2
and denote it as [n] \ {i1, i2}. Similarly, it holds that i2 /∈ H. Now consider S|H| and let
T = [n] \ S|H|. H ∩ T = ∅ and therefore S|H| = H. Then S|H|−1 ∈ F and there exists
h ∈ H such that S|H|−1 = H \ {h}, which again is a contradiction. 2
From the lemma it follows that the collection of maximal strictly nested sets of such
a quasi-building set will contain chains of length n. It also follows that for any feasible
coalition there is a chain where the coalition is a part of it. Further, there may exist
maximal strictly nested sets which are not a chain. The next lemma concerns the choice
function of such a quasi-building set.
Lemma 5.9 Given a quasi-building set Q(F) = (H, U) where F is a convex geometry on
[n], for any two feasible coalitions T, S ∈ F with T ⊂ S it holds that i ∈ U(S) ∩ T implies
i ∈ U(T ).
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Proof. Take any S, T ∈ F , T ⊂ S where P (S \ {i}) exists and i ∈ T. From P (S \ {i}),
pick a set of feasible coalitions S1, . . . , Sl which covers T \ {i}, i.e., Sk ∩ (T \ {i}) 6= ∅
for any k = 1, . . . , l and T \ {i} ⊂
⋃l
k=1 Sk. Then from intersection closedness between T
and S1, . . . , Sl, there is a partition T1, . . . , Tl of T \ {i} where Tk = T ∩ Sk, k = 1, . . . , l.
Further, the set {T1, . . . , Tl} is the maximal partition of T \{i} since P (S\{i}) is a maximal
partition of S \ {i} satisfying (Q2). Therefore P (T \ {i}) exists and i ∈ U(T ). 2
This result shows that condition (Q4) holds for the choice function of the quasi-
building set coming from a convex geometry. Condition (Q5) is implied from intersection-
closedness of convex geometries and therefore we have the following.
Corollary 5.10 For a convex geometry F on [n], Q(F) is an intersection-closed quasi-
building set on [n].
One of the solutions defined on the class of augmenting systems or convex geometries
is the Shapley value in [5] and [7], which considers maximal chains of length n. Given a
set system F which is a convex geometry or an augmenting system, the AMV-value of the
quasi-building set game, where the quasi-building set is constructed as
• H = F ,
• U(H) = {i ∈ H | H \ {i} ∈ F} for each H ∈ F ,
will coincide with the Shapley value in [5] and [7]. Note that the one-point extension
condition of underlying set systems ensures that U(H) 6= ∅ for all H ∈ F .
As we show in Section 2, when the set system is a building set the choice set of a
feasible coalition defined as Definition 5.6 is the coalition itself. Further, it can be shown
that the AMV-value of Q(F) of a building set F is equal to the gravity center solution
introduced in [17], because the collection of maximal strictly nested sets of a building set
F defined in [17] is identical to the collection of maximal strictly nested sets of Q(F) and
corresponding marginal vectors are calculated in the same way. In [17] it is shown that,
for a building set, the gravity center coincides with the Shapley value defined in [12] using
the Monge algorithm. Furthermore, if the building set is the collection of all coalitions of
players, then the AMV-value of the corresponding quasi-building set game (v, (2[n],1)) is
the Shapley value of the game v, see [20], which follows from the fact shown in [17] that
in this case the gravity center solution coincides with the Shapley value. Since the quasi-
building set (2[n],1) is intersection-, and weakly union-closed, and any two distinct subsets
of player set is both union-closed and strongly union-closed, both Q-supermodularity and
Q-convexity in that case boil down to the usual supermodularity. The quasi-building set
(2[n],1) is also a chain quasi-building set, and Q-chain increasing in that case implies the
usual supermodularity (take an increase sequence S1, S2, S3 and H as S1 = S ∩T, S2 = S,
S3 = S ∪ T and H = T for any S, T ∈ 2[n]).
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Theory, Birkhäuser, Boston, pp. 139-149.
[9] Derks, J. and R.P. Gilles (1995), Hierarchical organization structures and constraints
in coalition formation, International Journal of Game Theory 24, 147-163.
[10] Dilworth, R.P. (1940), Lattices with unique irreductible decompositions, The Annals
of Mathematics 41, 771-777.
[11] Edelman, P.H. and R.E. Jamison (1985), The theory of convex geometries, Geometriae
Dedicata 19, 247-270.
[12] Faigle, U., M. Grabisch, and M. Heyne (2010), Monge extensions of cooperation and
communication structures, European Journal of Operations Research 206, 104-110.
[13] Faigle, U. and W. Kern (1992), The Shapley value for cooperative games under prece-
dence constraints, International Journal of Game Theory 21, 249-266.
[14] Frank, A. and E. Tardos (1988), Generalized polymatroids and submodular flows,
Mathematical Programming 42, 489-563.
30
[15] Herings, P.J.J., G. van der Laan, A.J.J. Talman, and Z. Yang (2010), The average tree
solution for cooperative games with communication structure, Games and Economic
Behavior 68, 626-633.
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